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III.

NO DEFERENCE IS DUE THE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD'S
ARBITRARY AND ERRONEOUS FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
REGARDING THE LEGAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MS.
ELLIOT AND PETRO-HUNT.
The Workforce Appeals Board based its Answering Brief on a misstatement

of the pertinent standard of review for the matter now before the Court. The Board
has erroneously submitted that, as long as its decision was "reasonable and
rational," this Court should affirm its findings and conclusions. Resp. Br. at 2.
Utah law on this point, however, is clear. This Court is not required to give
deference to the Workforce Appeals Board's because its erroneous findings and
conclusions regarding the issues presented by the within appeal, including: (1)
Whether Petro-Hunt was denied fundamental due process and the ability to prepare
and conduct a defense when the Administrative Law Judge refused to allow it to
conduct any discovery; (2) Whether the Workforce Appeals Board erred as a
matter of law when it concluded that Ms. Elliot was an "employee" of Petro-Hunt;
and (3) Whether the Workforce Appeals Board erred as a matter of law when it
rejected well-established industry practice and ignored principles of Utah law on
how the industry engages, establishes and characterizes the work of an independent
landmen.
///
///
///
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A.

No Deference Due Administrative Law Judge's Arbitrary Refusal
To Allow Petro-Hunt To Conduct Discovery.

Whether the agency's

interpretation

of a statute

is incorrect or

unconstitutional, are questions of law that are reviewed under a correction of error
standard with no deference to the expertise of the administrative tribunal. See
Esquivel v. Labor Comm'n, UT 66, 13-19, 7 P.3d 777 (2000),
In this case, the Workforce Appeals Board has asserted that there is no
specific due process right to discovery. Resp. Br. at 21. However, the Workforce
Appeals Board has ignored well established Utah precedent providing that litigants
in an administrative proceeding have a right to a fair trial, which necessarily
includes that right of litigants to conduct discovery in preparation of a proper
defense. Bunnell v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 740 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah 1987);
Nelson v. Department of Employment Sec, 801 P.2d 158 (Utah App.,1990);
Ellison, Inc. v. Board of Review, 749 P.2d 1280, 1285 (Utah Ct.App.1988)
(litigants in an administrative hearing have a "due process right to receive a fair
trial."); Anderson v. Industrial Commission, 696 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1985)(A
fair trial requires not only an absence of actual bias, but requires tribunals to avoid
even the possibility of unfairness); see also Bunnell v. Industrial Com'n of Utah,
740 P.2d 1331 (Utah,1987).
This due process right to discovery in the appeal of unemployment
determinations has been further codified in the Utah Administrative Code.
5.

Specifically, Utah Administrative Code Section R994-508-108 provides that an
administrative law judge may compel discovery where informal means of
discovery have been insufficient.

Moreover, the Code states that all discovery

processes established in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure may be utilized. UAC §
R994-508-108(3).
At the administrative hearing below, Petro-Hunt submitted in its motion for
discovery to the ALJ that it had attempted informal discovery, but informal
discovery was ultimately inadequate to allow discovery into whether Ms. Elliot
had engaged or continues to engage in an independently established trade and
occupation as a broker of oil, gas and mineral leases. ROA at 71-94. The ALJ did
not make any specific findings or conclusions with regard to whether Petro-Hunt9s
efforts to conduct informal discovery were inadequate under Utah Administrative
Code Section R994-508-108.

Rather, the ALJ arbitrarily denied Petro-Hunt's

request for formal discovery. This blatant denial of due process prevented PetroHunt from discovering and presenting evidence that was necessary to its
preparation of a complete defense. In this regard, Petro-Hunt was prevented from
presenting dispositive evidence that Ms. Elliot was an independent landman who
was engaged by companies in the oil and gas industry as an independent
contractor.
///
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B.

No Deference Due Workforce Appeals Board Erroneous Legal
Conclusion That Ms. Elliot Was An "Employee" Of Petro-Hunt.

Utah appellate courts do not give deference to Workforce Appeals Board's
construction and application of law in unemployment casek unless the statutory
language being applied and construed evinces the Legislature's specific intent to
commit such broad discretion to the administrative agency because of the agency's
expertise in given area. Trotta v. Department of Employment Sec, 664 P.2d 1195
(1983).

Contrary to the Workforce Appeals Board's position, Utah case law

provides that proper application of the Employment Security Act and the relevant
regulations adopted thereunder do not require specialized or technical knowledge
that would be uniquely within the Workforce Appeals Board's expertise; therefore,
the Court of Appeals is not required to give the agency's decision deference. See
Ekshteyn v. Department of Workforce Services, 45 P.3d 173, 443 Utah Adv. Rep.
20 (2002); Autoliv ASP, Inc. v. Department of Workforce Services, 29 P.3d 7, 424
Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (2001); SOS Staffing Services, Inc. v. Workforce Appeals Bd.,
983 P.2d 581, 372 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (1999)
Here, the Workforce Appeals Board has baldly asserted that there is a
default rule presuming that all landmen are employees of those that pay them
absent evidence proving otherwise to the tribunal's own "satisfaction." Resp. Br.
at 19. However, there is no default rule in Utah holding that a "landmen" is an
independent contractor. That is to say, Utah law does not automatically classify all
7,

"landmen" to be employees as the Workforce Appeals Board contends. Indeed, no
Utah case or statute specifically addresses whether "landmen" are independent
contractors or employees under the Utah Unemployment Security Act.
Under Utah law, when a statute or regulation is silent on a matter, common
law or other state law addressing the same issue can be persuasive authority,
especially where the law of the sister state is substantially similar to the law being
construed in the forum state. See Arndt v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, 378 Utah
Adv. Rep. 22, 1999 UT 91, f 17, 991 P.2d 584, 589 ("When Utah law is not fully
developed on an issue, Utah courts look to "the case law from other jurisdictions
for guidance."); State v. Montiel 531 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 2005 UT 48, 122 P.3d
571 (2005).
In this case, the Workforce Appeals Board failed to recognize and address
the similarities between Utah law and Texas law when it summarily disregarded
the fact that Texas law recognizes that landmen are independent contractors not
employees. Importantly, Texas and Utah apply the same test for determining
whether an individual is an independent contractor. Compare Utah Code § 35A-4204(3) and Utah Admin Code § R994-204-303 (Factors for Determining
Independent Contractor Status) to Schievink v. Wendylou Ranch, Inc., 227 S.W.3d
862 (Tex.App.-Eastland, 2007) (citing Indus. Indem. Exch. v. Southard, 138 Tex.
531, 160 S.W.2d 905, 907 (1942)(An independent contractor has been defined as
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"any person who, in the pursuit of an independent business, undertakes to do a
specific piece of work for other persons, using his own means and methods,
without submitting himself to their control in respect to all its details.") and Tex.
A & M Univ. v. Bishop, 156 S.W.3d 580, 584-85 (Tex.2005) (citing Indus. Indem.
Exch., 160 S.W.2d at 906) (the factors used to determine whether or not a worker
is an independent contractor under Texas law are: (1) the independent nature of his
business; (2) his obligation to furnish necessary tools, supplies, and material to
perform the job; (3) his right to control the progress of the work, except as to final
results; (4) the time for which he is employed; and (5) the method of payment,
whether by time or by the job.)
There are important policy reasons why Utah, absent specific direction from
the State Legislature, should follow the Texas example and hold that independent
landmen, such as Ms. Elliot, should be deemed independent contractors rather than
employees. Most importantly, throughout the oil and gas industry, independent
landmen are consistently recognized and treated as independent contractors by
their clients.

ROA at 150; 224-227.

Indeed, according to the American

Association of Professional Landmen ("AAPL"), the voluntary trade organization
associated with this profession, independent landmen such as Ms. Elliot are "selfemployed" and "serve clients on a contract basis".

ROA at 150; 224-225,

Independent landmen have specialized knowledge and skills which are unique to

9.

their profession, including researching courthouse and abstract office records to
determine the ownership of oil, gas and mineral rights, preparing specialized
reports, and procuring leases for their clients. ROA at 112; 143; 147. Moreover,
independent landmen are retained on a project-basis to assist their clients with their
energy exploration and development efforts. See id. Because the nature of the
business involves short-term projects, it would be impracticable to require energy
companies to hire independent landmen as long-term employees when their
services will no longer be needed after a particular project ends.
Hence, it is clear that landmen, whether in Utah or Texas, are generally
engaged in a trade recognized by the industry as independent. Excluding landmen
from coverage under Utah's Employment Security Act makes sense because of the
unique nature of the services they render and the business realities of the oil and
gas industry. In this regard, Utah Courts have consistently recognized the nature
and realities of businesses who engage shoe shiners, auto mechanics, plumbers,
barbers and siding installers to conclude that individuals engaged in these
independently established trades were not employees of the companies they
contracted with.1
1

North Am. Builders, Inc., v. Unemployment Compensation

In the Fuller Brush case, the Utah Supreme Court explained:
A takes to the blacksmith a horse to be shod and a plow point to be
sharpened. The smith renders personal service and receives remuneration for
his time and labor, which constitutes wages under the act. But it was not
contemplated that A should pay contributions on the money paid the
ETacksmith, nor that the smith should be eligible for benefit
10,

Divisions, Dept., 22 Utah 2d 338, 341-342, 453 P. 2d 142, 144-145 (1969)(citing
Leach v. Board of Review, 123 Utah 423, 260 P.2d 744 (195ft).
The Workforce Appeals Board has completely disregarded the sensible
approach taken by the Utah Supreme Court and, in so doing, has erroneously
concluded that Ms. Elliot was an employee of Petro-Hunt. Indeed, a review of the
Workforce Appeals Board's position has evolved from the field investigator's
finding that Ms. Elliot was an "office manager" for Petro-Hunt to an admission
that Ms. Elliot "generally performed work that fit within the duties" of an
independent landman.

Resp. Br. at 5, 6. By characterizing Ms. Elliot as an

employee, the Workforce Appeals Board has erred as a matter of law by deviating
from well-established industry practice and related principles of Utah law.
///

compensations under the act as now written. The blacksmith performs his
task of shoeing the horse and sharpening the plow point according to his
own methods and ideas without direction or control from A, who may leave
the shop while the work is done, relying and depending upon the smith's
superior knowledge and ability. The work is done away from all places of
business of A,— and the smith is customarily engaged m an independently
established trade, to wit, blacksmithing. Other illustrations are the shoe
shiner; the auto-mechanic who repairs or overhauls a car; the dentist; the
butcher who cuts up the deer the hunter brings in; the plumber who cleans
out the drains and perhaps replaces parts of the plumbing; the C. P. A. who
comes in and audits the books; ana the barber who cuts the hair, gives a
shave, massage and shampoo; and the surgeon performing an operation on
the patient. In these simple illustrations, such people all render personal
service for a remuneration, but they are free from control in ttie doing
oTthe service, that is, they are their own bosses as to how they do it;
tEev perform services outside the employer's place of business, or
outside the usual course of his business, and they are all customarily
engaged in an independently established trade, business or profession.
Fuller Brush Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 99 Utah 97 (Utah 1940Xemphasis
supplied.^
11.

C.

No Deference Is Due The Work Force Appeals Board's Arbitrary
Factual Findings Because The Findings, When Analyzed Under
Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-204(3)(a), Do Not Support The Legal
Conclusion Of The Tribunal.

Moreover, under UAPA, an agency's factual findings will be affirmed "only
if they are 'supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record before the court.' " Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 67
(Utah App.1989) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1988)). See
Department of the Air Force v. Swider, 824 P.2d 448, 451 (Utah App.1991).
Substantial evidence is "more than a mere 'scintilla' of evidence ... though
'something less than the weight of the evidence." Id. "Substantial evidence is
'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion."

Id.

Whole record review under the substantial evidence test

considers the evidence in support of the administrative finding, as well as evidence
that detracts from the finding. Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus/Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 578 Utah Adv. Rep. 20, 164 P.3d 384 (2007).
When, as in this appeal, there are mixed questions of law and fact, the
reviewing court must engage in a two step analysis when applying the substantial
evidence standard set forth in the Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1989). See
id. at 392. First, identify the law which governs the contested issue, as such law
establishes what facts had to be proven, and how such facts had to be proven. See
id.; see also State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-37 (Utah 1994); Pullman-Standard v.
12.

Swint 456 U.S. 273, 290 n. 19, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (defining a
mixed question of law and fact as occurring when "historical facts are admitted or
established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy
the statutory standard, or ... whether the rule of law as applied to the established
facts is or is not violated"); Drake v. Industrial Commission, 939 P.2d 177 (Utah
1997)(facts must be analyzed under legal rule and support the conclusion of the
tribunal). Second, review the record on appeal and determine whether the record
contains both that quantity and quality of factual evidence which a reasonable man
could accept as adequate proof of what the governing law requires. First National
Bank of Boston v. County Board of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163 (Utah 1990). If
the record on appeal does not contain both that quantity and quality of factual
evidence which a reasonable man could accept as adequate proof of what the
governing law requires, then the decision of the administrative agency may be
deemed by the Court to be clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and
substantial evidence on the whole record, or arbitrary, capricious or characterized
by abuse of discretion. Id.; see also Swider, 824 P.2d at 451; Grace Drilling, 776
P.2d at 68.
1.

Summary Of The Governing Law

In this case, the Utah Code requires an individual to satisfy two tests in order
to be classified as an independent contractor and be exempted from the state

13.

unemployment statue. First, the individual must be "customarily engaged in an
independently established trade, occupation, profession, or business of the same
nature as that involved in the contract of hire for services." Utah Code Ann. §
35A-4-204(3)(a).

Second, the individual must be "free from the control or

direction over the means of performance of those services." Utah Code Ann. §
35A-4-204(3)(b).
The Utah Administrative Code sets forth a number of factors that are
relevant to determining whether an individual is an employee or an independent
contractor. See Utah Admin Code § R994-204-303.

Applying the foregoing

governing authority to the quality and quantity of evidence presented to the
Workforce Appeals Board, this Court should reverse the Workforce Appeals
Boards erroneous determination that Ms. Elliot was an employee of Petro-Hunt.
2.

Quality and Quantity Of The Evidence Does Not Support
Legal Conclusion Of The Administrative Law Judge And
The Workforce Appeals Board That Ms. Elliot Was An
Employee Of Petro-Hunt.

The decision of the Workforce Appeals Board and Administrative Law
Judge unduly relies solely on the testimony of Ms. Elliot.

Without

corroborating evidence to support the testimony relied upon, the quality of
testimonial evidence of Ms. Elliot is dubious. In this regard, the Administrative
Law Judge was not provided with a complete cross-examination of Ms. Elliot
because the Administrative Law Judge refused to allow Petro-Hunt to conduct
14.

discovery and present facts contradictory to the self-serving testimony of Ms.
Elliot.

For example, Petro-Hunt was prevented from cross-examining Ms.

Elliot regarding her representations about the amount and sources of her
income. Specifically, Petro-Hunt was denied the opportunity to obtain copies
of Ms. Elliot's 1099 forms and tax returns and, thus, had no way to challenge
the testimony of Ms. Elliot. Moreover, these documents would have been
highly relevant to Petro-Hunt's examination of Ms. Elliot regarding whether she
held herself out as an independent contractor, whether she had been treated by
the industry in general as an independent contractor, and whether she had the
opportunity for profit or loss as an independent broker.
The only other evidence considered by the Administrative Law Judge,
besides Ms. Elliot's testimony, was the DSW's evidence supporting its
conclusion that Ms. Eliot was an "office secretary and office manager for PetroHunt," ROA at 1-3. However, this conclusion was conceded by all parties to
be false.

Contrary to the field auditor's finding, the evidence presented

established that Ms. Elliot was never an "office manager" or "secretary" for
Petro-Hunt.

ROA at 125; 218-219; 222; 226-227.

Rather, the evidence

established that, as an independent landman, Ms. Elliot was commissioned to
perform due diligence on the leases acquired through the Trifecta Project,
I
primarily the Paradise Leases. ROA at 125; 142-144; 149-151; 218-219; 222;

15.

226-227, Ms. Elliot reviewed lease title documents and records; and, using her
own computer and software, prepared specialized reports, updated lease
spreadsheets and organized lease and ownership summaries. ROA at 112; 218219.
Moreover, the evidence relied upon by the Administrative Law Judge
and the Workforce Appeals Board supporting its findings on the factors for
determining whether an individual is an employee or an independent contractor
is insufficient.
For example, regarding the second factor for determining whether an
individual is an employee or an independent contractor, the undisputed
evidence established that Ms. Elliot had a substantial investment in her tools
and equipment. ROA at 218-219; 222. To fulfill her duties as a contractor for
Petro-Hunt, Ms. Elliot was required to provide her own computer and software,
which were the primary tools used by Ms. Elliot in connection with her work.
ROA at 218-219; 221-222; 226-227. Ms. Elliot also used her own personal email account to communicate with the company.

Id.

Nonetheless, the

Workforce Appeals Board arbitrarily refused to recognize that the second factor
weighed heavily in favor of independent contractor status.
Additionally, when deciding that the third factor favored employee
status, the Workforce Appeals Board selectively emphasized the perceived

16.

constraints of a broker agreement between Ms. Elliot and Petro-Hunt.
However, the evidence presented to the Workforce Appeals Board showed that
Ms. Elliot regularly performed landman services for other clients besides PetroHunt. In this regard, Ms. Elliot admitted to performing landman services for
three other brokerage companies, including Hingeline Land and Title, Bowman
and Associates, and Baseline. ROA at 120-122, 218-219; 222-223. Moreover,
the evidence presented to the Workforce Appeals Board established that, while
contracting with Petro-Hunt, Ms. Elliot was not required to work full time and
was permitted to work as much or as little as she wished. ROA at 220; 222223. Based on the evidence presented, the Workforce Appeals Board should
have concluded that the third factor favored independent contractor status, not
employee status.
Addressing the fourth factor as favoring employee status, the Workforce
Appeals Board ignored evidence of how Ms. Elliot was paid and the underlying
legal arrangement between Petro-Hunt and Ms. Elliot.

In this regard, the

evidence presented showed that Ms. Elliot presented invoices to Petro-Hunt
which were paid upon receipt. ROA at 219. Ms. Elliot was in a position to
realize a profit or loss from her fee for services because she controlled her costs,
could hire helpers and could take on additional work. ROA at 219-220; 222223.

17.

In summary, the quantity and quality of the evidence considered by the
Workforce Appeals Board simply does not support the legal conclusion that
Ms. Elliot was an "employee" of Petro-Hunt.
IV.

CONCLUSION
In accordance with the foregoing, Petro-Hunt respectfully requests that the

Court of Appeals reverse the Workforce Appeals Board's December 3, 2007
Decision and hold that Ms. Elliot was an independent contractor.

In the

alternative, the Court should remand this matter for proceeding consistent with the
Petro-Hunt's rights and privileges accorded by the Employment Security Act, the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the U.S. and Utah Constitutions and be
permitted to prepare and present a complete defense.
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